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Abstract
The importance of a  country's  "investment climate"  for  level data for rigorous analysis of the investment climate,
economic growth has recently received  much attention.  and investigate  empirically the effects of this
Hallward-Driemeier,  Wallsten,  and Xu address the  comprehensive  set of measures on firm performance  in
general lack of appropriate  data for measuring the  China.  Overall,  their firm-level  analysis  reveals that the
investment climate and its effects.  The authors use a new  main determinants  of firm performance  in  China are
survey of 1,500 Chinese  enterprises  in five cities  to more  international  integration,  entry and  exit, labor market
precisely define and measure components of the  issues, technology  use, and access to external  finance.
investment climate,  highlight  the importance  of firm-
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7644, fax 202-522-1155, email address psintimaboagye@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted
on  the  Web  at  http://econ.worldbank.org.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  mhallward@worldbank.org,
swallsten@worldbank.org,  or Ixul@worldbank.org.  March  2003.  (49 pages)
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Firm-Level Evidence  from China
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'We  are grateful  to David Dollar, Shuilin Wang, Anqing  Shi, Yang Yumin, Li Hui, and Lei Pingjing for their help
in making this research  possible.  The dataset was collected under the sponsorship of DFID of United Kingdom.In recent years, policy makers and multinational  organizations have focused increasingly
on the importance of a sound "investment climate"  in developing countries for economic growth
(Stern, 2002b).  Focusing on investment used to mean advocating  increased investment
quantities under the assumption that a financing  gap was a barrier to development.  Few accept
this simplistic view anymore, and, indeed,  recent research demonstrates surprisingly  little
correlation between investment levels and growth rates, at least in the short run (Easterly  1999).
Instead, a productive  "investment climate"  can be broadly thought of as an environment  where
governance and institutions support entrepreneurship  and well-functioning markets in order to
help generate growth and development.
It is difficult to define "investrnent climate" precisely, but Stem (2002b) notes that it is
the "policy, institutional, and behavioral environment, both present and expected, that influences
the returns, and risks, associated  with investment."  In general, this includes three broad
categories.  The first includes macroeconomic  or country-level matters, such as fiscal, monetary,
exchange  rate policies, and political stability.  The second includes governance and institutions,
including bureaucratic  harassment and the financial  and legal  systems.  The final category
includes  infrastructure necessary for productive investment, including transportation, electricity,
and communications.'
While these categories seem straightforward,  identifying  their effects is not easy.  In
particular, the second two categories pose special difficulties.  In addition to measurement
problems (e.g., eliciting truthful responses about bribery and corruption), another issue is that
many of these factors affect individual firms and may not show up in useful ways in aggregate
macroeconomic  statistics.  For example, it is often noted that India and China have grown  at
dramatically different rates over the past decade so that while they had similar per capita
incomes in 1990, the average Chinese citizen now has an income 50 percent higher than the
average Indian citizen.  Moreover, as this paper will demonstrate,  firms grow in quite different
pace in the five Chinese cities even though they face similar macro and national political
environments. Uncovering the factors underlying such large differences in growth rates requires
microeconomic,  as opposed to macroeconomic,  data.  Unfortunately,  there is often very little
'  There are several ways one might group various investment climate components.  In this paper we generally
follow the typology laid out by Stem (2002a; Stem 2002b).
1firm-level data in developing countries.  Indeed, while there is a good deal of country-level work
on many of these issues, firm-level  analyses are only now beginning to emerge.
This paper has three main goals.  First, it attempts to build a comprehensive  empirical
framework around the "investment climate" typology with firn-level data.  That is, there has
been much discussion of the investment climate, but as yet few comprehensive  measures of it.
Second,  it demonstrates the necessity of having data at the finn-level, as opposed to more
aggregated levels, to capture the impact of the investment climate on performance.  Country-
level, cross-country, empirical  analyses implicitly assume that each investment climate measure
has the same impact on each country when controlling for certain country characteristics.  Such
analyses are useful in that they can tell us what factors affect aggregated macro indicators on
average.  However,  economies are heterogeneous and such aggregated analyses cannot tell us
which factors may be important within different countries.  Firm level data allows us to assess
factors that comprise the investment climate  on firms themselves.  Finally, we use a new
enterprise-level  dataset  covering  1500 Chinese enterprises in five cities to illustrate the above
points, investigate the effects of various investment climate measures on firm performance, and
highlight areas in which reforms may most improve firm performance  in China.
Strong firm performance  can itself be measured on different dimensions.  Here, we
address four:  sales growth, investment rate, productivity and employment growth.  After
discussing some investment climate measures,  the strategy of this paper is to analyze the data at
increasingly disaggregated  levels. We first present some aggregate city-level data.  While such
city-level aggregations  already represent an improvement over country-level  analyses,  it will be
clear that the aggregated numbers hide a great deal of variation  at the firm level.  We then move
to an enterprise-level  analysis to examine in more detail how the investment climate affects firm
performance.  The enterprise-level analysis itself has two components:  first, we estimate the
effects of city-industry investment climate variables on firm performance controlling  for firm
characteristics, and second, we estimate the effects of the firm-level variation in the investment
climate itself.
At the most general level, the empirical results suggest that the biggest impacts on firm
performance come from international  integration, entry and exit, labor market issues, finance,
and technology.  Some infrastructure problems common in other developing countries such as
2losses from electricity outages  appeared to have little impact on Chinese firms, on average.  The
analysis also finds that controlling for firm characteristics  and city and sector dummies:
*  More foreign ownership is positively associated with sales, investment, and employment
growth;
*  Barriers to entry and exit are associated with lower productivity and sales and
employment  growth, while younger firms consistently perform better on all measures;
*  Access to finance is correlated with higher sales growth, investment,  and productivity;
*  Increased labor market flexibility is associated with higher investment and productivity;
*  Higher staff quality is associated with higher sales, investment, and productivity, and
investment  in worker training is correlated  with faster sales  growth and investment rate
and possibly productivity;
*  Access to information technologies and research and development  are correlated with
better outcomes;
While the results should be interpreted with caution - we discuss a number of caveats
below - they highlight the importance and necessity of firm-level data in gathering information
below country and even aggregate sub-national  levels.  In the sections below we first discuss our
data and the survey that generated it.  Second, we discuss in some detail various components of
the investment  climate and what the literature says about them so far.  In this context we also
present results from the survey aggregated up to the city level.  These results show large
differences  in many measures across cities, with Shanghai and Guangzhou  generally the leader,
Tianjin and Chengdu the laggard.  In some cases they also highlight the difficulty surveys face in
gathering  truthful information about sensitive issues.  Third, we move to the firm-level analysis,
which shows in more detail how these measures affect firm performance.  Finally, using the
firm-level results we assess the quantitative importance of various investment climate aspects.
China is a particularly interesting country in which to study the impact of differing
investment climates across regions.  Overall,  China's growth performance has been  impressive,
but economic conditions vary across regions, with eastern and coastal areas generally having
developed more quickly and attracted more investors than have mid- and western areas.  Two
broad factors help explain this phenomenon.  The first is differences  in natural endowments,  such
as access to ports.  The second is the nature of decentralization of the Chinese economy and
3policy making.  For years, regional governments have been given different degrees of discretion
in setting economic policy.  Thus,  some experimental provinces and cities were given greater
freedom to choose more liberal policies to attract foreign capital.  For instance, Guangdong has
been at the forefront of pro-market reforms.  Furthermore, the central and regional tax
arrangements were negotiated province by province, giving regional govemments different
incentives for economic performance  (Gordon and Li 2002).  These differences have also given
rise to strong regional protectionism (Poncet 2002), as carefully documented by the State
Development Planning Commission (2000).  Together, the differences in initial endowments,
regional discretion  in policy making, tax arrangements, as well as leadership tumover pattems
have led to strong regional variations in the investment climate; differences that will be exploited
in the analysis presented here.2 To the extent that sub-national level analysis of investment
climate is particularly important in countries that are large, decentralized  and feature local
discretion and non-integrated markets, China is an excellent country in which to conduct such an
analysis.
Data and Investment Climate Measures
A good deal of work has by now gone into measuring aspects of the investment climate.
These include, for example, measures of investment risks (the International Country Risk Guide
from the PRS Group), transparency (Transparency International),  competitiveness  (The Global
Competitiveness Report from the World Economic Forum), governance  (e.g., in Kaufmann,  et al.
1999; 2002), and regulatory burdens (Djankov, et al. 2002).  Each of these indices has proven
quite useful and informative.  One notable feature, however, is that they are all at the country
level.  That is, each country receives one score for every indicator.  Such indicators have limited
potential in pinpointing obstacles to firm productivity and investment and are thus of limited use
in contributing to specific policy advice.
More detailed analysis requires data at the firm, rather than the country, level.  In order to
uncover the effects of the investment climate  on individual firms, the World Bank is conducting
firm-level surveys in a number of developing and transition economies.  An earlier World Bank
initiative, the World Business Environment  Survey (WBES), assessed manager's  opinions on
2 In this study the five regions included are among some of the stronger performers  so that the differences would be
4obstacles their firms faced.  The interest it generated in using micro-data to analyze areas for
reform helped stimulate the larger effort to collect more quantitative information that could allow
for more rigorous assessments, larger sample sizes that could allow for sub-national inferences to
be drawn, and means for measuring how the obstacles directly affected firm performance.  That
effort became the investment  climate survey work, which is collecting detailed firm-level data in
more than 20 countries.
In China, the investment climate (IC) survey was undertaken in collaboration with the
Enterprise Survey Organization of the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics.  The survey
included  1500 firms-300 from each of five cities surveyed-and ten industries.  The cities
include Beijing, Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shaghai, and Tianjin.  998 firms are in manufacturing
sectors while 502 are in services.  Table 1 lists the specific sectors and the number of firms
surveyed in each.  The survey aimed at being as comprehensive  as possible, collecting
information on, for example, inputs and outputs,  suppliers and customers,  finances, interactions
with the government,  labor market issues, technology, infrastructure,  and corruption.  Moreover,
rather than just asking managers for their opinions on certain issues, the survey collected  factual
information, providing more objective,  quantitative measures of the investment climate.  Thus,
for example, rather than asking managers to gauge on a scale of I to 6 the quality of the power
supply as an obstacle to conducting business, they report the number of outages and the value of
the production lost due to inconsistencies  in the power supply.
The investment climate is comprised of many factors,  as discussed above.  These include
sound and stable macroeconomic policies, which are not our focus in this paper as those are truly
macro, rather than micro, level indicators and as such will not vary across our sample.3 We can
narrow the categories beyond the general ones listed above to include the extent of intemational
integration; private sector participation;  entry, exit, and other administrative  barriers, labor
market flexibility, physical infrastructure,  skills and technology  endowment, and functioning of
financial markets.
International  Integration
even starker should less industrialized  or integrated regions be included in the comparison.
5A good deal of research suggests that countries that are more integrated into the global
economy grow more quickly (see, for example, Maloney  2001; Sachs and Warner 1995).
Integration and openness can take the form of import competition, production intended for
export, foreign direct investment, and foreign ownership.  Integration  can boost productivity by
increasing the degree of competition  and forcing producers to be more efficient and more
innovative.  Integration also encourages  the flow of ideas and managerial know-how to domestic
firms.  Studies that look at firm responses  to reduced trade tariffs document  a resulting
improvement in productivity,  with those facing import competition  being the most likely to
invest as a result of the policy change (Levinsohn  1993; Pavcnik 2000).  Improved access to
inputs and capital equipment can boost productivity,  and the prospect of serving larger markets
through exports  can improve scale economies and affect firms' decisions regarding investment,
training, technology and the quality of inputs -- all steps associated with higher productivity
(Hallward-Dreimeier,  et al. 2002).
Import competition varies quite a bit across the five cities in our sample (Figure 1).
Finns in Guangzhou report that, on average,  imports account for more than 12 percent of the
domestic market for their main product. Shanghai  is a fairly distant second at just under nine
percent, followed by Beijing at about eight percent, Tianjin at 7.4 percent.  Chengdu was far
behind the rest, with imports accounting  for not quite six percent of domestic sales of those
firms' main products.
Ownership
State-owned firms in developing countries were typically  shielded from competition,
inefficient, and often ended up receiving a constant flow of subsidies to stay afloat (World Bank
1995).  A great deal of research has found that private firms are more efficient than state-owned
firms,  and that firm performance  improves after privatization (Megginson  and Netter 2001;
Shirley and Walsh 2000).  The difference between state-owned and private (or privatized) firms
is most apparent in industries that are competitive in most of the world
Private foreign ownership is given particular attention as it is usually associated with
higher productivity.  Foreign  firmns often have access to superior technology, greater access  to
3The China survey is one of the first completed under the new initiative.  As the number of available country
6export markets, and new management techniques.  The foreign firms themselves may be more
productive,  and the possibility of spillovers through linkages and demonstration effects raises the
possibility that the presence of foreign firms could benefit their suppliers and even their
competitors.  Finally, foreign owners tend to be large shareholders,  who can internalize the costs
of monitoring and tend to yield greater efforts in monitoring (Shleifer and Vishney,  1985).  As a
result, the CEO works harder, and firm performance  improves.  (See Saggi (2002)  for an
overview of the literature).
Figure  2 shows the share of foreign and state ownership of the firrns in our sample by
city.  Government  (including national, state/provincial,  local/municipal,  and others including
cooperatives  and collective enterprises)  on average owned 22% of firms, and foreign investors
21%.  This average,  however, hides large variation across the cities.  The figure shows that
Guanzhou has the lowest share of government ownership and the highest share of foreign
ownership.  At the other extreme, Chengdu has the highest share of government  ownership (at
around 30 percent) and the lowest share of foreign ownership (at around five percent-one-
seventh of Guangzhou's foreign ownership level).
Entry and  Exit
The ease of firm entry and exit is an important deterninant of productivity, investment,
and entrepreneurship  (e.g., Lansbury and Mayes  1996).  Relatively easy entry and exit allows
poorly performing firms to leave the market and dynamic new ones to enter.  Unfortunately,
many developing and transition governments fail to recognize that firm births and deaths are an
inevitable corollary of entrepreneurial  risk-taking, and instead erect a maze of  administrative
obstacles  to starting, operating, and closing firms.
Entrepreneurship,  especially,  is an important contributor to economic growth and welfare
improvements  in transition and developing countries.  New firms "have usually been the fastest-
growing segment in transition countries"  (McMillan and Woodruff 2002).  The scale and effects
of entry can be impressive-Deng Xiaoping expressed his surprise that "all sorts of enterprises
boomed in the countryside, as if a strange army appeared suddenly from nowhere" less than a
datasets grows, the role of different macroeconomic  policies can be examined in  cross-country comparisons.
7decade after the first reforms in China in 1978 (Zhao 1996 as quoted in McMillan and Woodruff
2002).
A growing body of literature documents the difficulty entrepreneurs  face in establishing
firms in developing countries (e.g., Djankov, et al. 2002; Emery, et al. 2000; Friedman,  et al.
2000).  Djankov, et al. (2002) compiled data on entry regulations  in 85 countries,  and discovered
enormous variation  in the number of procedures required to start firms across countries, ranging
from a low of two in Canada, to as many as 21  in the Dominican  Republic (with Bolivia and
Russia a close second at 20). The time required to establish a firm ranged from two to 152
business days (in Madagascar).  These procedures can be extremely costly to the economy-the
cost of official procedures (that is, not including bribes) for setting up a new business was 266
percent of per capita income in Bolivia.  They find that stricter regulation of entry is correlated
with more corruption and a larger informal economy.  Likewise, Emery et al. (2000) found that
in Africa, "when added together, this whole maze of often duplicative, complex, and non-
transparent procedures can mean delays of up to two years to get investments approved and
operational."
One of the difficulties  with surveys done over a relatively short period of time is that it is
not possible to measure entry and exit.  Moreover, there is a serious truncation problem since
firms that have exited are, tautologically, no longer around to be surveyed.  Nonetheless, two
questions in the China survey are potential proxies for entry and exit:  excess capacity and the
share of a firm's costs used to subcontract other firms (Figure 3).4
The first measure of entry and exit barriers is excess capacity.  Firms often operate with
some excess capacity given adjustment costs and lumpiness of certain investments.  Nonetheless,
very high levels of excess capacity can indicate that unproductive  firms are not exiting the
market, simultaneously blocking entry by new finns.  In the survey, manufacturing firms were
asked to provide their capacity utilization from 1997-2000, which, inversely, yields excess
capacity.  The figure reveals that firms in Chengdu have the highest level of excess capacity,
while Guangzhou and Shanghai have the lowest.
4 One additional possible measure of entry and exit is market share, which the survey also collects.  The problem
with this indicator is that it is very difficult to interpret.  Increased concentration (as indicated in higher market share
for a give firm) may indicate a lack of  competition.  On the other hand, productive and efficient firns are also likely
to increase their market share and thus industry concentration.  A great deal of literature  on this question was rarely
able to reach consensus on which effect is likely to dominate (Bresnahan  1989).
8The second measure  is the share of the firm's cost used for subcontracting.
Subcontracting  may be indicative of entry and exit barriers in two ways: in a more flexible
market any given firm may have less reason to keep all activities in-house, while the availability
of subcontractors  could indicate  ease of entry and extent of firm specialization.  In this case
Figure 3 shows that Shanghai has the highest level of subcontracting,  while Chengdu has the
lowest.
Regulatory and  Administrative Barriers  to Firm Operation
In addition to the rather large steps of opening or closing a business, firms also deal with
regulatory  and administrative issues that affect day-to-day operations.  Friedman, et al. (2000)
compile indices of taxation levels and "over-regulation"  (essentially, indices of the business
environment) of firms in 69 countries.  While they find no evidence that higher tax rates drive
firms underground, "...every available measure of over-regulation  is significantly correlated
with the share of the unofficial economy and the sign of the relationship  is unambiguous:  more
over-regulation  is correlated with a larger unofficial economy" (Friedman, et al. 2000).  In other
words, while higher tax rates did not seem to drive away investors, the myriad array of obstacles
to starting and running a business do.
Many of these barriers are also associated with corruption,  as they often involve
payments to inspectors who visit the firm or to officials who grant operating permits.  Corruption
comes in other forms as well.  When infrastructure is poor, bribes are often required to get
telephone or electricity connections.  Corruption can easily deter foreign and domestic investors.
Recent empirical research confirms that measures of corruption are significantly and negatively
related to FDI inflows (e.g.,  Smarzynska and Wei 2000; Wei 2000).5
The survey makes several attempts to uncover information about administrative
hassles  and corruption.  As one might expect,  questions on these topics are the ones firms are
5This discussion should not be interpreted as implying that regulations  in developing countries are only onerous and
unnecessary.  On the contrary, many regulations and regulatory agencies can be important for mitigating market
failures (e.g,., environmental  problems), protecting consumers (e.g., against firms that can exercise market power),
and ensuring safe working conditions.  The issue is that regulations  in developing countries tend to be more complex
and bureaucratic than necessary, are associated with corruption,  and often are not intended to correct market failures
or protect consumers.  Indeed,  Djankov, et al. (2002) find that more regulations are generally not associated with
better societal  outcomes in developing countries.
9least likely to answer, and most likely to not respond truthfully when they do answer (see
Recanatini, et al. 2000 for a survey of the survey literature).
While few firms answered direct questions  about side payments and bribes, many more
firms answered indirect questions about red tape, bureaucratic hassle, and the potential need to
pay bribes.  Managers  were asked how much time they spend with government officials dealing
with business regulations.  Firms also provided the number of  days in a year that various
inspectors visit their facilities.  The results are reported in Figure 4.  The reported numbers were
somewhat surprising: managers in Beijing report spending the largest share of their time dealing
with regulatory issues, while firms in Guanzhou receive the most frequent visitations from
various government agency inspectors.  Chengdu appears to have the least government
interference of the five cities.  However,  two sets of possibilities may explain these results.  First,
government interference may be lower in Chengdu simply because finrs invest less and take
fewer risks, thus submitting fewer permit applications that bring government inspections.
Second, and related, inspectors  may be more likely to harass growing and more profitable firms,
since there are more rents to extract from them.
However, another statistic sheds more light on government interference  across  cities.
Figure 5 shows the share of firms refusing to disclose the time managers spend dealing with
regulations.  Firms in Chengdu were three times as likely to refuse to respond to these questions
as in any other city.6  Large refusal rates may indicate fear of consequences of responding to the
question, indicating especially  severe problems - particularly when these firms were willing to
provide information  on other virtually all other topics.
Regulations that have particularly strong impact on firms are those covering the labor
market.  Restrictions on firing, hiring seasonal or contract workers, and provision of certain
benefits can affect firm productivity as it affects a firm's ability to adjust production to demand.
Moreover, while restrictions on firing may benefit employees already hired (as long as the finn
remains in business), they can end up as obstacles to growth by creating an incentive for firms to
not hire additional permanent labor.  In the face of such constraints,  firms may seek to use
temporary labor rather than new permanent workers.  Non-permanent workers allow firms
6 The share of firms that refuse to respond in  Chengdu increases to 40 percent if we assume that a response of zero
is  equivalent to reftising to answer.  The differences  in  response rates to the question of inspections was much less
striking,  so in  the analysis we focus on the share of firms that were willing to respond to questions of interactions
with officials and with the number of inspections.
10flexibility to adjust to changing demand conditions.  Figure 6 shows the average  share of
employment that is non-permanent by city.  Chengdu has the smallest share of temporary
workers at around  12 percent, while Guanzhou has the largest at 21 percent.
Quality and  Availability of  Physical and Technological  Infrastructure
The quality and availability of infrastructure,  including transportation,  electricity, and
communications,  can have large impacts on firm productivity and growth potential,  as well as on
the likelihood that new firms will locate in an area.  Indeed, much research has linked these to
economic growth in developing  countries (e.g., Canning 1999; Canning and Bennathan  2000;
Easterly and Rebelo  1993).7  China's physical infrastructure has undergone rapid improvements
in the last decade.  Compared to India,  for example, power outages are rare and waits for phone
lines (or mobile phones) practically nonexistent.  Moreover,  improvements  in those areas
continue (The World Bank 2002a).
Firms'  access to information and computing technologies (ICTs) and their use may affect
productivity and economic growth.  Clarke (2002),  for example,  using enterprise-level  data in
Eastern European transition economies,  finds that even controlling for endogeneity, firms that
have Intemet access are more likely to export than firms that do not.8 Bhavani (2002) finds that
use of technology is beneficial for firms in the Indian auto components industry.  Moreover,
ICTs-or, more accurately,  involvement in ICT industries-have also been important in spurring
regional economic growth in places such as Taiwan and Bangalore  (Arora, et al. 200 1; Athreye
2002; Saxenian  and Hsu 2000).  To compare the use of ICTs across cities in our sample, we
construct a principal components index that consists of the share of a firm's employees that use
computers,  the number of telephones per employee, and the share of employees that use the
Intemet in their jobs.  Figure  7 suggests that firms in Shanghai are the most ITC intensive, while
firms in Chengdu are the least.
7 It is not always clear, however, when public investment  in infrastructure  leads to economic growth.  Under some
conditions it may have large positive effects, under other conditions it crowds out private investment, and under
other conditions-often  when the investment was done for political reasons-has  no effect at all.
8  In a complementary paper, Clarke (2001) fnds that foreign-owned firms are more likely to have Intemet access.
Moreover,  he found evidence of spillovers from this access, with FDI increasing Internet access among domestic
firms other than firm receiving the FDI.Access to finance
Access to external finance can also affect growth and productivity.  Businesses  will
invest in projects where the expected benefits exceed the costs.  Efficient investment, however,
can happen only when businesses  do not face credit constraints unrelated to their own
performance.  Indeed, a great deal of research demonstrates the importance of well-developed
financial markets for economic growth (see Caprio,  et al. 2001  for an extensive summary).  In
general, countries with deeper financial systems tend to grow faster than countries with more
shallow ones.  Relatively few firms in China have access to formal finance than in other Asian
countries (The World Bank 2002b).  Approximately half of the firms in our sample have neither
a bank loan or a loan from any other financial institution, and on average  only about 20 percent
of firms' working capital comes from bank loans.
To better measure firm access to external  finance we construct a principal components
index of formal capital use.  The index is comprised of whether a firm has a bank loan, the
number of banks a firm uses, whether the firm has an overdraft facility or line of credit, the share
of loans denominated in a foreign currency,  and the share of inputs the firm buys on credit from
its suppliers.  A disadvantage of this index is that by using it we cannot tease out different effects
of different types of finance.  On the other hand, the index has certain advantages.  It captures
not just the use of formal finance, but also the breadth of financial vehicles available to the firm.
As a result, this helps us partly avoid the well-known  problem of Chinese state-owned banks
continuously providing loans to money-losing state-owned enterprises.  This phenomenon could
result in measures of a firm's ties to banks indicating poor performance.  We believe that our
index should be a good measure of both the depth and breadth of finance  alternatives available to
the firm.  Figure 8 shows that, according to this index,  Shaghai has the best access to external
finance,  Guangzhou  second best, while Tianjin the worst.
Empirical Analysis
The city averages presented above provide some interesting comparisons, but still do not
allow us to investigate the effects of particular investment clirnate measures on fuim
performance.  This section attempts to more rigorously evaluate the effects.  We use a simple
reduced-form regression analysis, estimating  several versions of equation (1).
12(1)  y,.  = j6o  +  61 *(IC  indicators) + 82 Z + a,  + as + Ei
The dependent variable is firm performance,  for which we use four measures: sales
growth, employment growth, investment rate, and total factor productivity (TFP).9  Z is a vector
of firm-level control variables likely to influence firm performance.  These include initial sales,
employment, the firm's age, and level of fixed assets in some specifications.  We also control for
city (ao) and sector (a)  fixed effects.  IC indicators  include our investment climate measures,
which relate to the discussion above.  More specifically,  they include share of foreign and
domestic ownership, the share of output produced for export, the share of imports for the
domestic market in the firm's main product line, excess capacity, the share of costs
subcontracted,  share of labor that is nonpermanent, a staff quality index, the share of labor that
receives formal training from the firm, a finance index, a research and development intensity
index, an information and communication technology (ICT) index, the share of output lost as a
result of power outages, the share of output lost through theft, the time (in days) spent dealing
with government inspectors,  and whether firms refuse to answer questions about senior
management time with inspectors.
One of the difficult conceptual  problems with the analysis is determining how exactly
each investment climate factor is likely to affect the firm.  For example, a firm may delay
investments if it has substantial excess capacity.  However, the total excess production capacity
in a particular industry or market is also likely to influence a firm's investment decisions.  In this
case even a firm with very little excess capacity may be unlikely to invest if the industry as a
whole has excess capacity.  The implication  of this observation  is that some investment climate
indicators may have different impacts at the firm and at more aggregated levels.  Another reason
for aggregate-level  analysis is that some view the investment climate as similar for certain cluster
of firms.  To investigate this possibility,  in one specification we estimate equation (1) only with
city-sector averages  of those variables  to see whether that measure of market conditions affects
the firm.  After estimating the equation with the city-sector averages, we turn to an analysis using
purely finm-level variables.  Both analyses yield interesting results, but results from the firm-
level variables seem more robust than those from the city-sector variables, further highlighting
the need for firm-level data.
13In addition to the above conceptual problem, the analysis faces some practical
econometric obstacles:  endogeneity, multicollinearity,  and,  in the pure finn-level analysis,
missing observations.  While we do not have perfect  solutions to these problems, we recognize
them and attempt to deal with them, as discussed below.
Endogeneity  is a serious problem in investment climate analysis.  The direction of
causality is often not clear, and competing hypotheses can sometimes explain a particular result.
Unfortunately,  the large number of issues and variables  we deal with in this paper make
infeasible  an instrumental variables approach to mitigating the endogeneity.  Instead, we deal
with this in a few ways.  First, our city-sector IC variables are more likely to be exogenous to the
firm, since any given firm only weakly affects the city-sector average.  Second, the regressions
include city and sector dummies which helps control for those more macro issues that affect both
the IC variable and the firm.  Third, in addition to the regressions that explore the IC variables
one by one, estimating the equation with all variables together helps eliminate omitted variables
problems,  though at the cost of multicollinearity,  as discussed below.  And finally, we rely on
common  sense, openly discussing the competing explanations  for results and which explanations
seem to best fit all the evidence.
The multicollinearity problem, meaning that many of the variables in which we are
interested are likely to be correlated with each other, can make it difficult to interpret results.
The share of a firm's workforce that receives formal training, for example, is probably correlated
with staff quality.  Such correlations leave us needing to balance potential omitted variables bias
if we leave out variables correlated with each other, with the multicollinearity problems when
including all relevant variables.
The sample size problem arises  from the fact that some data is missing for every firm.
This is not a severe problem when we use the city-sector means as the relevant  IC measure, as
we simply calculate the means from all available  firms.  It is a much more severe problem in the
purely firm-level analysis,  since selecting only the observations  that have complete information
for all the IC variables reduces the sample size substantially.  Indeed,  including all the variables
causes the sample size of 1500 firms to decrease by more than half.
9 To denve the TFP measure, we first estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function by each sector, allowing for
firm fixed effects.  The residual (including  the fixed effects) is then TFP.  Estimates based on the translog
production  function estimates are similar.
14To deal with both multicollinearity and the sample size problem we run the regressions
not only with all the variables included, but also with each IC variable by itself along with only
minimal controls (initial sales, capital, or employment,  depending on the dependent variable,
firm age, and city and sector dummies).  This practically eliminates the multicollinearity problem
(though at the expense of potential omitted variables bias).  Meanwhile,  it allows us to retain a
large sample size (1000 - 1300 firms) in the firm-level  analysis.'0 This approach has the added
benefit of being a robustness  check: we have more confidence in the results when they are
similar in regressions with all IC measures included and when only one IC measure at a time is
included.
Aggregate city-sector investment climate measures
Many of the indicators measured here are affected by policy at the provincial  level.  The
enforcement of national laws and regulations  can vary across provinces, and local governments
have substantial discretion  in shaping the provincial investment climate.  To analyze  the
importance of the investment  climate at the local level and to capture  the important differences
between locations, we calculated city-sector  averages for each of the investment climate
indicators.  As mentioned earlier,  these measures also benefit from being clearly exogenous  to a
particular firm while capturing the environment in which the firm operates.  To control for finm-
specific characteristics,  the analysis also includes firm age and initial conditions, while sector
dummies control for industry-level effects.  Since an observation in the regression is a firm, we
can control for firm-specific  characteristics  while allowing the IC measures to vary across city-
sectors (i.e., with five cities and ten sectors  each IC variable has 50 different values).
We run individual regressions  for each investment climate indicator as well as a more
comprehensive  specification  in which we include all measures simultaneously.  For the
regressions  looking at each IC variable individually, virtually all the coefficients were of the
expected sign and most were significant (Table 2a to 2f). 1  l  The extent of corruption,
'°  Fortunately,  the distribution of firms by city and sector remains quite close to the original distribution of 1500
firms.
"  To check for the robustness of results,  two additional  sets of regressions  were run.  The first used averaged
dependent variables to test if the investment climate  indicators are significantly correlated with average
perfonnance.  While variables  entered significantly if individual  indicators were included,  there were few remaining
significant results  once all the variables were included.  Given there were only 50 observations and so few remaining
15infrastructure,  innovation,  degree of openness  and the availability of finance yielded particularly
strong results.  While these variables exhibit variation at the firm level, they are also some of the
most plausible candidates of variables whose regional variation should be more relevant in
explaining  frnm behavior.
As noted above,  one concern with asking about corruption directly is that firms have no
incentive to answer truthfully, and may even be fearful of answering.  The data reveal strong
regional differences in the willingness to answer such questions.  Given the likelihood that non-
response was more likely to represent a higher rather than lower burden of corruption - we
decided not to use the reported responses  themselves.  Rather, we argue that the share of firms
willing to answer the question is itself a good proxy for the burden of corruption.  Thus, we
included the share of firms willing to answer a question about the time managers spend with
officials.  The measure  is strongly negatively correlated with sales growth, investment and
productivity (Table 2a).  In other words, firms in city-sectors where firms are, on average, less
willing to answer questions about corruption and government interactions tended to perform
worse.  A second variable we tested was the time spent in inspections.  Here, the non-response
issue was much more muted.  However,  the impact of the results are much smaller - and
positively rather than negatively correlated with performance.  Here the effect may be partly
explained as firms that are expanding and innovating may require additional permits.  This
interpretation is consistent with the general finding reported above that firms in Chengdu-
considered by many investors to have the worst corruption problems-shows the least time spent
with inspectors while Guanzhou-one of the most dynamic cities-has the most.  Indeed, an
interaction of the time with regulators variable and a dummy for whether the firm introduced a
new process or product the last three years captures the positive effect (the results unreported in
this paper), with the direct measure of time in inspections  losing its significance.
The share of sales lost in transit due to theft, breakage and spoilage in the city-sector is
negatively correlated with firm performance  (Table 2a).  This variable captures not just the costs
of production within a plant, but also costs associated with getting goods to customers.  Again,
degrees of freedom, the relatively weak results are not surprising.  A second set of regressions included city
dummies.  The effect was to lower the significance of a number of variables, which again was to be expected as
cities such as Shanghai and Guangzhou consistently score better on a variety of measures, while Chengdu often
scores the lowest.  The inclusion of city dummies is  also somewhat problematic  as the variation across cities is
precisely what we are trying to explain in these aggregated location regressions.
16while there is variation  at the firm level, one would expect significant variations across locations.
The effect is significantly negative, particularly for sales growth and productivity.
The availability of IT infrastructure  in the city-sector is is positively correlated with
performance  (Table 2b).  The greater the use of IT within a sector-location, the greater is sales
growth, investment and productivity.  Moreover, there is some evidence of spillover effects from
regional innovation efforts.  Average R&D activities and labor training practices in a city-sector
are significantly positive for all performance  measures.  That they are concentrated differently
across  locations further demonstrates the importance  in local variations in the investment climate
to spur firmns to imnprove their efficiency.
The openness of a location - to foreign owned firms and to competition from imports- is
associated with higher sales growth, productivity and employment growth (Table 2c).  The last
result in particular is consistent with the hypothesis that foreign  investors can be a source of
spillovers for local firms. Access to finance is also particularly strongly associate with better
performance  at the regional level (Table 2d).
The results for entry and exit at the aggregate level are robust, but only for some
dimensions of firm performance (Table 2e).  Since a higher share of subcontracting (as a share of
costs) implies more ease of entry, the share of subcontracting acts as a proxy for entry costs here.
It is positively and statistically significantly associated with sales growth and productivity.  As a
proxy for exit barrier, higher excess capacity is associated with lower productivity.  These pieces
of evidence are consistent with the hypothesis that exit barriers reduce productivity.
Features of labor market exert substantial influences on firm performance (Table 2f).
Higher staff quality is associated with a higher level of productivity.  And firms that train more
of their staff had higher sales growth, investment rate, job growth, and productivity.  More
overmanning in a city-sector  is negatively correlated with a given firm's sales and productivity.
Firms in city-sectors that feature higher share of non-permanent workers have higher investment
rates.
Looking at each IC indicator separately demonstrates  that many dimensions of the IC are
important.  However, it is more difficult to determine the relative importance of each dimension
when looking at all the aggregate  location variables together (Table 3): The multicollinearity of
many of the variables means that the effect of each can not be precisely estimated when all the
17city-sector IC measures  are included simultaneously.12 Within the larger regression,  some
coefficients are still statistically  significant for some outcomes.  A firm's import share is
positively associated with employment growth.  The share of firms refusing to answer questions
on managerial time with regulators  is still negatively associated with sales growth.  Access to
finance is still positively associated with productivity.  More R&D outlays are positively, while
share of sales lost from theft or breakage  is negatively, associated with employment growth.  The
development of ICT is positively associated with productivity.  The share of labor receiving
training is positively associated with sales growth, investment rate and productivity.  There are
also some surprising results.  For instance, firms in city-sectors that feature higher staff quality
have lower employment growth.  However, most importantly, a large number of variables lose
their statistical significance even though they are of the expected signs.  Looking at multiple
location-specific averages  limits the variation across variables, so the weakening of results in the
larger regression is not surprising.
Having explored the possible use of the data at a semi-aggregated level, we next turn to a
purely firm-level analysis.  The following section details the approach and results which,  in
general,  are much more robust than those an aggregated approach  yields.
Finn-level analysis
The last section characterizes the investment climate at the city-industry  level.  However,
the investment climate is likely to differ substantially below the city-industry  level for a number
of reasons.  There could be district-level competition, for instance.  Some districts might be
designed to be a science parks or special economic zone districts;  and economy of agglomeration
might show up at the district level instead of the city-industry  level.  The quality of infrastructure
and government effectiveness could differ at lower level than the city.  Moreover, the
enforcement of many laws could be at a more local level than the city level, leaving individual
firms facing quite different types of government-business  interaction within a city.  All these
considerations  suggest that it might be fruitful to take advantage of the variations of the
12 The specification  in Table does not control for city dummies.  However, our empirical experiments suggest that
controlling for it  makes little differences  in  our main qualitative results.
18investment climate at the firm level.  With these in mind, we turn to a detailed firm-level
analysis.
As in the analysis above, we first estimate each IC variable by itself, along with minimal
firm controls,  and then estimate the equation  with all IC variables included together.  As one
would expect given the larger sample size and the likelihood of multicollinearity,  the IC
variables are more likely to be significant when included without the other IC variables.
Nonetheless, even with all IC variables included  simultaneously, a large number of variables
remain significant.  Broadly speaking, the firm-level results are fairly robust, and are basically
the same regardless of which variables  are excluded or included.  We discuss the results in some
details below.  While we present the results for each variable included independently (see Table
4), we base our discussion on the results when including all variables simultaneously (Table 5)
and point out differences  between the two approaches when there are any.
The control variables tend to be statistically significant and of the sign one would expect.
Initial sales, capital, and employment are always negative and significant-not surprising  since
growth rates will be higher if the initial base is lower.  More interesting is that, even controlling
for initial conditions, younger firms have faster sales growth and investment and higher TFP than
do older firms.  It also appears that younger firms have faster employment  growth, although age
is significant in the employment growth regressions in the single-IC regressions but not with all
IC variables included.  Next we turn to the results on the IC variables.
International integration proves to be important (Table 4a), though not all indicators are
significant.  The share of the firm owned by foreigners was positively correlated with sales
growth, employment growth,  TFP, but not the investment rate.  The share of the firms' output
produced for export is significantly correlated with sales and employment growth when tested
without other IC variables but not statistically significant when all other variables are included.'3
The results in Table 4b reveal the importance of components of infrastructure and are
consistent with conventional wisdom about current Chinese industrial development.  Technology
use, in particular, tends to be strongly correlated with performance.  When all IC measures  are
included in the analysis, R&D is correlated with investment, TFP, and employment, while ICT
13 The import share of the domestic market for the firm's main product was positively associated with TFP when the
variable is included only with the control  variables (Table 4a), but not significant with all other variables included.
It was never significantly correlated with sales, investment, or employment  growth.  However, it should be noted
19use sales, investment, and TFP.  These two measures are, of course, highly correlated, which
makes including both problematic.  When examined individually, both the R&D and ICT use
indices are positively associated with growth in sales, employment, investment, and TFP.  In the
individual IC regressions, both variables are positively and significantly associated with all
performance measures.  In other words, even controlling for sector, city, age, and baseline
conditions, firms that do more R&D and use ICTs more intensively are more productive and
grow more quickly.
The share of production lost to power outages is negatively correlated only with TFP
when included without the other IC variables (Table 4b), and not significantly correlated with
any outcome when other IC measures are included (Table 5).  This result is consistent with
recent efforts to make the electricity  supply more reliable.
Labor quality and training tend to be positively correlated with firm performance (Table
4c and Table 5).  The staff quality index is positively correlated with investment, TFP, and sales
growth (when city are included).  The quality index is significantly positively correlated  with all
performance  measures in the individual IC regressions.  The share of the firm's labor force that
receives formal training from the firm is positively correlated with sales and investment,  and also
with TFP in the individual regressions.
The share of workers that are temporary (and seasonal) is positively and significantly
correlated with investment and TFP.  These results provide strong evidence that a more flexible
labor force helps firms grow and become more productive.  The analysis cannot determine  if this
is due to firms getting around particularly onerous regulations or if it reflects looser requirements
that allow finms greater flexibility in using temporary workers, although anecdotes would point
to the latter explanation.  Despite the difficulty of precisely identifying what causes this result,
the flexibility and training results together lead to a plausible conclusion: a flexible labor force is
associated with more productive and faster growing firms, but firms' investment in their labor
force pays off-firms that train more do better and firms with better workers do better.
The measurements of administrative hassles,  as discussed earlier, need to be interpreted
with caution.  The firms' estimate of the total number of days spent dealing with regulatory is
significantly associated with none of our dependent variables when all IC variables are included,
that this variable is one that is most likely to suffer from imprecise measurement.  Many managers-especially  of
small firms-may have had difficulty answering the question with any surety.
20and only with sales growth in the individual regression (Table 4d)-and the sign is positive.
There are at least two possible explanations  for this seemingly strange result.  First, firms that are
growing may attract more attention from government officials.  Second, firms with plans to grow
may need new permits  for expansion, thus necessitating additional meetings with regulatory
agencies  for the necessary permits.  The dummy variable indicating refusal to answer the
question about senior management time is negatively correlated with TFP, but nothing else.
The index of external finance is positively correlated with all four measures  in the
individual IC regressions  (Table 4e), and with sales, investment, and TFP when all IC measures
are included (Table 5).  This result suggests that access to external finance is an important
component of firm growth.
Finally, excess capacity is negatively correlated with sales and employment growth and
TFP (Table 4f and Table 5).  Significant excess  capacity can be a barrier to entry.  If the excess
capacity arises because  inefficient and unproductive firms remain in business through subsidies,
new firms may never enter if they cannot compete with firms facing soft budget constraints.  The
extent to which a firm uses subcontractors is positively correlated with TFP.
What do the results imply?
It is difficult to synthesize these results-each IC variable could be the basis of an entire
paper.  Nonetheless,  if we assume causality, they provide a base for us to estimate how the
average  firm may improve if certain elements of the investment climate were improved.  In this
section we use the significant coefficients  from the analysis to simulate the effect on sales,
employment,  investment, and TFP of a one standard deviation improvement in the IC variable.
In particular, we ask a simple question:  how much would we expect the four outcomes to change
when key IC indicators  increase by one standard deviation?  The one-standard-deviation  change
represents realistic advances  firms and local governments  can make to improve firm
performance.  To focus on the key factors, and to make sure that our point estimate is significant,
we only focus on those factors that are statistically significant in that outcome regression.  Table
6 reports  the findings based on the specifications of Table 5.
Improving foreign integration would appear to have one of the largest impacts.  A one
standard-deviation change in the share of foreign ownership would increase sales growth by 7.9
21percentage points, TFP by almost one-third,  and employment growth by 7.1  percent.  Decreasing
excess capacity would increase sales growth by 6.3 percent, TFP by 17 percent, and employment
growth by 3.5 percent.  To the extent that excess  capacity is caused by policies that prop up
inefficient and money-losing  firms, the analysis suggests that those policies are causing a serious
drag on the performance of other firms.
Improvements  in policies related to labor market could also have a large impact on
performance.  An increase in the share of temporary labor could increase sales growth by nearly
three percent, investment by 2.1  percent, and TFP by 11.1 percent.  One should be careful not to
interpret this result too literally.  It does not necessarily mean that more temporary workers, per
se, are better, simply that a more flexible workforce is beneficial to firm growth.  Indeed, higher
staff quality and training also improve performance.  A one standard deviation increase in the
share of the labor force that receives formal training could yield an increase in sales growth of
4.7 percent and an increase in investment of 2.1 percent.
Increasing the access to external finance would also have positive  impacts.  A one
standard deviation increase in our index would come with a 4.6 percent increase  in sales, a 1.8
percent increase in investment,  and a 10 percent increase in TFP.
Finally, technological  upgrading could be benefi6ial.  A one standard deviation increase
in our R&D index would increase investment by 2.6 percent,  TFP by 8.4 percent,  and
employment growth by 3.6 percent.  The same relative  increase in the ICT index, meanwhile,
could bring an increase of 6.7 percent in sales growth, two percent in investment, and 36.3
percent in TFP.
These estimates should not be interpreted with caution.  The calculations  assume that the
IC measures only affect furm performance, and not vice-versa.  It is also unlikely that any of the
variables  actually operates completely independently-one  may affect another in ways that our
analysis cannot capture.  Finally, even if one accepts the point estimates,  they do not necessarily
illuminate which policies would be effective and whether those policies would yield the
predicted results.
Nevertheless,  these simulations provide some evidence on the magnitude of the effects of
the investrnent climate.  It is perhaps more convincing to think of these simulations in the
negative.  Government policies to restrict foreign ownership are likely to have large negative
impacts, as are policies that allow unviable finms to continue operations and exacerbate any
22existing excess capacity problems.  Thus, while we would not assert that our simulations provide
definitive answers,  they do demonstrate that many IC measures are important to the economy
and suggest where policy initiatives could begin to focus.
Conclusion
The results of this analysis highlight both the importance of these investment climate
indicators on firm performance and the necessity of firm level data for rigorously exploring their
effects.  Nonetheless, this analysis barely scratches  the surface of what can be done with this sort
of data.  Each variable we discuss above relates to large bodies of literature and deserves much
more attention.
The analysis finds that, overall, firm performance is positively correlated with foreign
ownership, R&D, ICTs, staff quality, the share of the firm's labor force that receives  training
from the firm, and access to external finance.  Excess capacity is negatively correlated with firm
performance, while time spent with regulators is negatively correlated with TFP.  These
correlations  tend to be obscured by more aggregated data, and are simply unobservable  with
country-level  data.  Constructing policies that can effectively promote growth requires firm-level
data to truly understand bottlenecks to firm growth.  While the results should be interpreted with
caution, the analysis holds the promise of a great deal of additional research to uncover more
details of each part of the investment climate discussed here.
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30Table 1. Distribution of the Sample by Industry
Sector  Number firms
accounting and related services  104
advertising and marketing  89
apparel and leather goods  222
business logistics services  110
communication services  71
consumer products  -165
electronic components  203
electronic equipment  192
information  technology services  128
vehicles and vehicle parts  216
TOTAL  1500
31Table 2a. City-Sector Investment Climate Measures  and Firrm Performance:
Administrative Barriers and Corruption
Sales growth  Investment  TFP  Employment  Sales  Investment  TFP  Employment  Sales  Investment  TFP  Employment
rate  growth  growth  rate  growth  growth  rate  growth
Share of firms refusing to answer  -0.248  -0.122  0.701  -0.080
managers'  time with regulators  (2.31)--  (2.50)°*  (2.04)°  (0.56)
Time with regulators/inspectors  0.005  0.002  0.021  0.003
(3.34)..  (3  37)..  (4.73)..  (2.13)-
share of sales lost from theft or  -0.897  -0.276  -3.744  -0.673
breakage  (2.30)°°  (1.56)  (3.14r)  (1.24)
log(initial sales)  -0.042  -0.045  -0.044
(6.69).  (7.20)*-  (6.91 )
log(initial capital)  -0.009  -0.010  -0.010
(3.67)*°*  (3.97)...  (3.82)°°
log(labor)  0.002  -0.014  -0.009
(0.06)  (0.53)  (0.32)
log(initial labor)  -0.052  -0.053  -0.052
(3.52)°°  (3.51)...  (3.46)...
log(flrm age)  -0.145  -0.051  -0.370  -0.093  -0.144  -0.050  -0.379  -0.093  -0.143  -0.050  -0.368  -0.092
(11.25)°°°  (9.54)°°°.  (10.37)-o  (5.7l)°°°  (11.26)°°-  (9.36)ooo.  (10.78)...  (5.69)*°  ...  11*  (9.30)°t-  (10.38)°°°. (5.62)°°°
Constant  0.960  0.383  2.298  0.511  0.721  0.262  2.328  0.393  0.850  0.318  2.955  0.489
(9.96)°°°  (8.97) ...  (7.96)--°  (5.26)°-°  (10.07)...  (9.05) ...  (11.20)°°  (6.79) ...  (1  1.80)°°  (110.97)...  (16.45)°°°. (6.28)°°°
Observations  1294  1274  1333  1309  1294  1274  1333  1309
R-squared  0.20  0.17  0.63  0.10  0.20  0.18  0.63  0.10
Note.  $, **, $$$ represent statistical significance  at the  10, 5 and 1 percent levels. City and industry dummies included.
The investment climate variables are city-industry averages;  controls at the firm level are initial sales, capital, labor, and firm age.
32Table 2.b.  City-Sector  Investment Climate Measures  And Firm Performance:
Physical And Technological  Infrastructure
Sales  Investment  TFP  Employment  Sales  Investment  TFP  Employment  Sales  Investment  TFP  Employment
growth  rate  growth  growth  rate  growth  growth  rate  growth
ICT index  0.147  0.035  0.765  0.153
(3.90).*.  (2.12)-^  (7.63)...  (1.33)
R&D  index  0 094  0.042  0.448  0.123
(3.43).*.  (3.34)'*  (5.58)...  (2.21 )^
share sales lost from  -0.269  -0.360  -1.903  -1.483
electricity outages  (0.36)  (0.91)  (0.74)  (1.54)
log(initial sales)  -0.047  -0.045  -0.042
(7.43)...  (7.16)'*  (6.74)^**
log(initial capital)  -0.010  -0.011  -0.009
(3.97)...  (4.16)...  (3.65)...
log(labor)  -0.027  -0.028  -0.001
(0.99)  (1.02)  (0.05)
log(initial labor)  -0.056  -0.056  -0.051
(3.36).*.  (3.53)^*  (3.49).*.
log(firm age)  -0.140  -0.049  -0.350  -0.089  -0.144  -0.050  -0.367  -0.093  -0.143  -0.050  -0.371  -0.092
(10.88)...  (9.17)...  (9.97)...  (5.19)...  (11.23)***  (9.37)***  (10.43)...  (5.66)...  (11.09)***  (9.27)***  (10.41)***  (5.63) ...
Constant  0.696  0.274  2.122  0.328  0.868  0.333  3.094  0.536  0.809  0.317  2.854  0.510
(9.76)***  (8.97)-**  (11.05)**'  (3.53)^**  (12.50)...  (11.44)...  (17.13)***  (6.47)***  (10.31)^*^  (9.65)--  (13.95)...  (6.09) ...
Observations  1294  1274  1333  1309  1294  1274  1333  1309  1294  1274  1333  1309
R-squared  0.20  0.17  0.64  0.11  0.20  0.18  0.63  0.11  0.19  0.17  0.63  0.10
Note.  *, **, ***  represent  statistical significance  at the  10, 5 and  I percent levels.  City and industry dummies included.
The investment climate variables  are city-industry averages; controls at the firm level are initial sales, capital, labor, and firm age.
33Table 2c. City-Sector Investment Climate Measures and IFirm Performance:
]International Integration  and Ownership
Sales  Investment  TFP  Employment  Sales  Investment  TFP  Employment  Sales  Investment  TFP  Employment
growth  rate  growth  growth  rate  growth  growth  rate  growth
Share foreign ownership  0.216  -0.060  0.742  0.297
(1.87)-  (1.15)  (1.95)e  (2.26)--
Share domestic private  0.219  -0.089  -0.062  0.233
ownership  (1.35)  (1.25)  (0.12)  (1.33)
Imports as share of  0.010  0.002  0.033  0.014
domestic market  (2.81)°  (1.12)  (3.13)*°*  (3.10)***
Exports as share of sales  0.047  -0.036  0.208  0.074
(0.64)  (1.28)  (1.09)  (1.37)
log(initial sales)  -0.043  -0.044  -0.042
(6.89)-  (6.99)..  (6.76)..
log(intial capital)  -0.009  -0.009  -0.009
(3 56)...  (3.73)*  (3 63).
log(labor)  -0.006  -0.008  -0.003
(0.22)  (0.29)  (0.10)
log(initial labor)  -0.053  -0.054  -0.052
(3.50)o  (3.62)..  (3.50)-
log(firm age)  -0.140  -0.051  -0.357  -0.087  -0.139  -0.049  -0.361  -0.086  -0.142  -0.051  -0.367  -0.090
(110.71)-t  (9.36)...  (9.80)...  (5.29)...  (10.84)°°°  (9.11)*°°  (10.10)...  (5.58)...  (10.96)...  (9.3l)---  (I10.11)-  (5.43)...
Constant  0.611  0.379  2.746  0.244  0.784  0.300  2.706  0.425  0.797  0.306  2.758  0.454
(4.13)°°°  (5.83)...  (6.04)...  (1.78)°  (11.88)...  (10.89)...  (15.97)...  (7.54)a-  (11.99)**"  (11.13)*°*  (16.12)...  (7.42)...
Observations  1294  1274  1333  1309  1294  1274  1333  1309  1294  1274  1333  1309
R-squared  0.20  0.17  0.63  0.10  0.20  0.17  0.63  0.11  0.19  0 17  0.63  0.10
Note.  *, "'t,  **  represent statistical  significance at the 10,  5 and  1 percent levels. City and industry dunmnies included.
The investment climate  variables are city-industry averages;  controls at the firm level are initial sales, capital, labor, and firm age.
34Table 2.d.  City-Sector Investment Climate Measures And Firm Performance:
Finance
Sales growth  Investment rate  TFP  Employment  growth
finance index  0.084  0.016  0.543  0.087
(3.35)***  (1.61)  (7.78)***  (1.94)*
log(Qnitial sales)  -0.047
(7.20).**




log(initial labor)  -0.056
(3.51).*.
log(firm age)  -0.138  -0.049  -0.339  -0.088
(10.65)***  (9.09)***  (9.70)***  (5.51)...
Constant  0.910  0.322  3.355  0.551
(111.92)**  (10.98)***  (18.76)***  (5.70)***
Observations  1294  1274  1333  1309
R-squared  0.20  0.17  0.64  0.11
Note.  *, **,  ***  represent statistical significance  at the  10,  5 and 1 percent levels. City and industry dununies included.
The investment climate variables are city-industry  averages;  controls at the firm level are initial sales, capital,  labor, and firm age.
35Table 2e. City-Sector  Investment Climate Measures and Firm Performance:
Entry and Exit
Sales  Investment  TFP  Employment  Sales  Investment  TFP  Employment
growth  rate  growth  growth  rate  growth
Contracting  as share of costs  1.034  0.145  6.451  0.404
(2.07)**  (0.70)  (4.41)***  (0.69)
Excess capacity  0.450  0.283  -1.955  0.040
(1.50)  (2.52)**  (2.29)**  (0.14)
log(initial sales)  -0.044  -0.042
(7.03)***  (6.68)***
log(initial capital)  -0.009  -0.009
(3.73)***  (3.64)**.
log(labor)  -0.012  -0.002
(0.45)  (0.07)
log(initial labor)  -0.052  -0.051
(3.49)***  (3.50)***
log(firm  age)  -0.142  -0.050  -0.362  -0.092  -0.145  -0.051  -0.364  -0.093
(11.06)...  (9.27)***  (10.21)***  (5.63)***  (11.26)***  (9.40)***  (10.06).**  (5.80)*.*
Constant  0.804  0.303  2.742  0.456  0.800  0.306  2.756  0.458
(12.13)***  (11 .05)***  (1  6.29)***  (7.46)***  (12.04)***  (11.15)***  (16.14)***  (7.37)**"
Observations  1294  1274  1333  1309  1294  1274  1333  1309
R-squared  0.20  0.17  0.63  0.10  0.19  0.17  0.63  0.10
Note.  *, **,  ***  represent statistical  significance at the  10, 5 and 1 percent levels. City and industry dummies included.
The investment climate variables are city-industry averages;  controls at the firn  level are initial sales, capital, labor, and firm age.
36Table 2f. City-Sector Investment  Climate Measures  and Firm Performance:  Labor
Sales  Investment  TFP  Employment  Sales  Investment  TFP  Employment
growth  rate  growth  growth  rate  growth
Panel A:
Staff quality index  0.055  0.024  0.697  0.042
(1.05)  (1.19)  (5.21)*r  (0.44)
Share of labor that receives formal training  0.337  0.109  1.097  0.274
(4.55)**^  (3.70)**-  (5.34)^-*  (3-99)-*-
log(initial sales)  -0.043  -0.049
(6.80)*'  (7.56)**-
log(initial capital)  -0.009  -0.011
(3.71)*  (4.31)*-
log(labor)  -0.006  -0.029
(0.22)  (1.06)
log(initial labor)  -0.051  -0.058
(3.49)'*  (3.75)-
Observations  1294  1274  1333  1309  1294  1274  1333  1309
R-squared  0.19  0.17  0.63  0.10  0.21  0.18  0.63  0.11
Panel B:
Overmanning  -0.485  0.062  -1.975  -0.312
(1.69)*  (0.49)  (2.23)**  (1.04)
Share of nonpermanent  0.201  0.164  0.261  0.349
workers  (1.06)  (2.08)*'  (0.48)  (1.46)
log(initial sales)  -0.042  *0.042
(6.77)-*  (6.8l)*--
log(initial capital)  -0.009  -0.009
(3.66)-  (3.68)*^*
log(labor)  -0.002  -0.002
(0.06)  (0.07)
log(initial labor)  -0.051  -0.051
(3.50)*.*  (3.51)***
Observations  1294  1274  1333  1309  1294  1274  1333  1309
R-squared  0.20  0.17  0.63  0.10  0.19  0.17  0.63  0.10
Note.  , **,  '**  represent statistical significance at the  10, 5 and 1 percent levels. City and industry dummies mcluded.  The coefficients for the intercept and
firm age are suppressed. The results on firm age remain very similar to those in other tables.
The investment climate variables are city-industry averages; controls at the firm level are initial sales, capital, labor, and firm age.
37Table 3.  City-Sector Investment Climate Measures and  Firm Peerformance
Sales growth  Investment  rate  TFP  Employment growth
Imports as share of domestic market  0.003  0.002  -0.005  0.014
(0.63)  (0.91)  (0.30)  (2.37)-
Share foreign ownership  0.179  -0.148  -1.147  0.026
(0.80)  (1.26)  (1.45)  (0.08)
Contracting as share of costs  0.780  -0.222  1.799  -0.701
(1.17)  (0.75)  (0.92)  (0.72)
Excess capacity  0.689  0.200  -0.246  0.206
(1.43)  (1.00)  (0.16)  (0.31)
Share of nonpermanent workers  0.122  0.210  -0.669  0.503
(0.46)  (1.62)  (0.73)  (1.27)
Time with regulators/nspectors  0.005  0.003  0.002  0.003
(2.29)-  (2.56)*-  (0.23)  (1.08)
Share of firms refusing to answer  40.298  40.107  0.098  -0.003
managers! time with regulators  (1.90)-  (1.32)  (0.21)  (0.02)
finance index  0.022  0.012  0.354  0.017
city-sector  (0.57)  (0.78)  (2.97)aa  (0.30)
averages  Staff quality index  -0.020  -0.038  -0.055  -0.158
(0.22)  (1.14)  (0.21)  (2.14)-
R&D  index  0.009  0.008  0.108  0.143
(0.20)  (0.33)  (0.72)  (1.97)-
0.084  -0.102  -0.743  0.115
(0.36)  (0.86)  (0.97)  (0.31)
share of sales lost from theft or  -0.076  -0.164  0.576  0.127
breakage  (0.13)  (0.61)  (0.31)  (0.22)
share sales lost from electricity  -1.597  40.863  0.415  -3.488
outages  (1.19)  (1.27)  (0.09)  (2.22)-
ICT index  0.077  0.030  0.355  0.099
(1.32)  (1.02)  (2.02)--  (0.66)
firm exports as share of sales  0.153  0.011  0.134  0.179
(3.96)...  (0.73)  (1.21)  (2.73).
share of labor receiving training  0.137  0.048  0.356  0.000
(5.30).  (4.37)-  (4.79)...  (0.01)
38Table 3.  City-Sector Investment Climate Measures  and Firm Performance (Cont'd)
Sales growth  Investment rate  TFP  Employment growth
log(firm age)  -0.121  -0 046  -0.307  -0.068
l 9.  11)--  (8.53)...  (8.02)...  (4.84)-^^
share  capital leveraged  0.118  0.021  -0.071  0.061
(2.88)^-*  (1.19)  (0.55)  (1.16)
log(initial sales)  4.056
(8.12)^-
log(initial capital)  -0.013
firm  level  (4.80)-^
log(labor)  -0.072
(2.52)^^
log(initlal labor)  -0.074
(3.89)^*
border  0.028  0.006  -0.170  0.056
(1.16)  (0.46)  (1.86)-  (1.55)
Constant  0.697  0.459  4.148  0.451
(2.03)-^  (2.53)^*  (3.69)r*  (0.87)
Observations  1181  1165  1224  1193
R-squared  0.25  0.23  0.67  0.14
Note. *, *,  *  represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and I percent levels.  Industry dummies included.
39Table 4.a. Firm-LeveR Analysis:
Il nternational  Rntegration
Sales  Investment  TFP  Employment  Sales  Investment  TFP  Employment  Sales  Investment  TFP  Employment
growth  rate  growth  growth  rate  growth  growth  rate  growth
Share foreign ownership  0.140  0.002  0.813  0.102
(3.25)--  (0.1 1)  (6.54)--a  (2.07)-
Share domestic private  -0.054  -0.003  0.311  -0.009
ownership  (1.76)-  (0 24)  (3.24)-°°  (0.25)
Imports  as share of  0.084  0.026  0.435  0.101
domestic market  (1.13)  (0.84)  (2.04)"  (1.62)
Exports as share of sales  0.130  -0.000  0.058  0.143
(3.50)-  (0.02)  (0.52)  (3.41)-
log(initial sales)  -0.033  -0.034  -0.028
(5.58)-  (5.19)-  (4.80)-
log(inifial capital)  -0.027  -0.032  -0.027
(8.40)  aa  (9.04)-  (8.45)-
log(labor)  -0.041  -0.033  -0.047
(1.63)  (1.21)  (1  .82)-
log(iniUlal  labor)  -0.058  -0.043  -0.062
(5.82)-°  (5.55)..  (6.45r)
log(firm age)  -0.132  -0.073  -0.270  . -0.082  -0.148  -0.070  -0.330  -0.084  -0.132  -0.070  -0.355  -0.072
(9.12)--t  (13.04)-§  (7.26)*°-  (4.73)...  (10.30)--a  (12.64)...  (8.56)°°°  (6.73)...  (10.0or-°  (13.55)°°*  (9.83)°-°  (4.56)-9
Constant  0.633  0.305  2.568  0.466  0.626  0.338  2.861  0.342  0.700  0.353  3.146  0.500
g849)o-a  (10.9l)--a  (10.42)--t  (5.5l)-°  (8.72)--*  (12.75)-*  (11.67)--a  (6.56)ooa  (9.59)°°°  (14.3l)--°  (14.01)...  (7.21)r°
Observations  1220  1298  1263  1235  1036  1093  1062  1043  1188  1261  1231  1200
R-sguared  0.17  0.25  0.66  0.13  0.17  0.26  0.66  0.16  0.15  0.24  0.65  0.13
Note.  ,  t,  and  *  represent statistical significance  at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.  City and industry dummies included.
40Table 4.b. Firm-Level Analysis:
Infrastructure and Technology
Sales  Investment  F  Employment  Sales  Investment  TFP  Employment  Sales  Investment  TFP  Employment
growth  rate  T  growth  growth  rate  growth  growth  rate  growth
ICT index  0.064  0.031  0.375  0.029
(5.28)...  (5.86)...  (10.70)...  (2.14)--
R&D  index  0.019  0.031  0.192  0.041
(1.82)  (7.38)r*  (6.36)...  (3.35)*..
share  sales lost from  0.057  0.017  -0  851  0.246
electricity outages  (0.35)  (0.25)  (1.69)-  (1.30)
log (initial sales)  -0.034  -0.035  -0.027
(5.52)...  (5.45)...  (4.50)...
log (initial capital)  -0.031  -0.030  -0.027
(9.62)...  (9.62)...  (8.61)...
log (initiial labor)  -0.059  -0.066  -0.055
(5 98)--  (6 19)...  (5.59)--
log (labor)  -0.047  -0.087  -0.041
(1.84)'  (3.20)...  (1.63)
log  (firm age)  -0  126  -0.065  -0.286  -0.077  4.142  -0.072  -0.339  -0.083  -0.145  -0.073  -0.352  -0.093
(9.29)...  (12.43)...  (8.03)'--  (4.78)...  (10.47) ...  (13.94)***  (9.45)'-  (5.03)..  (11.03)...  (14.30)...  (10-01)...  (5.82)**-
Constant  0.645  0.344  2.784  0.505  0.792  0.322  3.663  0.434  0.588  0.301  2.657  0.463
(8.50)*-  (13.60)--  (12.49)...  (6.92)  (9.91)-..  (13.19)  (16.01)...  (6.06)'--  (8.77)-  (12.49)-  (12.55)-  (6.36)...
Observations  1149  1227  1190  1162  1141  1219  1185  1154  1222  1300  1265  1237
R-squared  0.17  0.26  0.68  0.12  0.17  0.29  0.67  0.13  0.15  0 25  0.65  0 12
Note.  *  *  and *** represent  statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.  City and industry dummies included.
41TabRe 4.c. Firm-Level Analysis:
Labor
Sales  Investment TFP  Employ.  Sales  Investment  TFP  Employ.  Sales  Investment TFP  Employ  Sales  Investment TFP  Employ.
growth  rate  growth  growth  rate  growth  growth  rate  growth  growth  rate  growth
Share of non-  0 075  0.044  0.21  0 023
permanent workers  (1  59)  (2 25)-  (1.52)  (044)
Staff quality index  0 056  0 036  0.32  0 03
(4 69)...  (7 45)...  (9  76)*-  (2.04)-
Share of labor that  0.108  0 06  0 298  -0.012
receives training  (4 46)--  (5.81)-  (4.23)*-  -0 42
Overmanning  -0.207  -0 075  -0.453  -0.072
(2 84)--  (2.50)-  (2 08)-  (0.90)
log(initial capital)  -0 026  -0 035  -0.033  -0 029
(8.27)...  (9 50)---  (9.65)---  (8.83)...
log(labor)  -0.04  -0 047  -0.053  -0 055
-1 55  (1.69)'  (1 93r  (2.06)-
log(initial labor)  -0.056  -0 07  -0  061  -0.057
(5.84)...  (5 75).e  (5 37)-'  (5.60)*.*
log(inibal sales)  -0 025  -0  043  -0.035  -0 026
(4.23)--  (6 20)...  (5.32)*..  (4 11)--*
log(firm  age)  -0.136  -0.069  -0 353  -0 081  -0.129  -0 058  -0 274  -0.084  -0 13  -0.065  -0.3  -0.087  0.128  -0.066  -0.305  -0.084
(10.19)-  (13.28)-  (9.81).  (5.14)*  (8.70)  (10  19)-  (7 32)**  (4.35).  (9 04)'  (11.53)..  (7.86)  (4.72)  (8.99)-  (11.82)'  (8 09)-  (4.98).
Constant  0.698  0.346  3.094  0.522  0.53  0.169  2.152  0.331  0 702  0.285  2.882  0.584  0.533  0.303  2 617  0 467
(9.37).  (13  93)--  (13 61).  (7 38)  (5.42).  (4 61)  (6 68)-  (2.92).  (8.69)..  (10.14)-  (11  94)-  (7.10)..  (7.62)--  (12  18)-  (12  37).*  (6.34)
Observabons  1188  1261  1231  1200  953  1009  1015  961  1030  1097  1069  1041  1075  1145  1115  1089
R-squared  0.15  0 24  0.65  0 12  0  19  0.3  0 72  0.14  0.18  0.28  0.67  0.12  0.15  0.25  0.65  0.12
Note.  *, t,  and ¢** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.  City and industry dummies included.
42Table 4.d. Firm-Level Analysis:
Administrative Burdens and Corruption
Sales  Investment  TFP  Employment  Sales  Investment  TFP  Employment  Sales  Investment  TFP  Employment
growth  rate  growth  growth  rate  growth  growth  rate  growth
Time with regulatorsfinspectors 0.048  0.009  -0.087  0 023
(2.19)-  (0.94)  (1.31)  (0.91)
Share of firms refusing to  -0.019  0.003  -0.186  -0.022
answer managers'  time with
regulators  (0.62)  (0.21)  (2.12)--  (0.61)
share of sales lost from theft or  -0.179  -0.028  -0.230  0.043
breakage  (1.00)  (0.37)  (0.43)  (0.21)
log(initial sales)  -0.028  -0.027  -0.027
(4.70)*..  (4.49)-*'  (4.55)-
log  (initial capital)  -0 027  -0.027  -0.027
(8.65)--  (8.11)***  (8.62)...
log(labor)  -0.034  -0.037  -0.040
(1.34)  (1.43)  (1.57)
log (initial labor)  -0.057  -0.056  -0.055
(5.70)...  (5.35)...  (5.62)-
log(firm age)  -0.145  -0.073  -0.352  -0.093  -0.141  -0.074  -0.354  -0.094  -0.145  -0.073  -0.351  -0.094
(11.10)***  (14.34)--  (10.00)*-*  (5.83)...  (10.49)...  (13.90)**  (9.84)...  (5.60)...  (11.06)...  (14.33)*..  (9.97)***  (5.85).*.
Constant  0.589  0.300  2.605  0.475  0.607  0.306  2.603  0.391  0.597  0.303  2.609  0.479
(8.94)--  (12.65)*^*  (2.44)***  (6.60)***  (8.90)***  (12.42)***  (12.32)*-*  (5.54)***  (9.02)-*'  (12.73)**-  (12.42)*-*  (6.67)***
Observations  1222  1300  1265  1237  1131  1203  1167  1143  1222  1300  1265  1237
R-squared  0.16  0.25  0.65  0.12  0.15  0.25  0.66  0.12  0.15  0.25  0.65  0.12
Note.  *, *,  and ***  represent statistical significance at the 10,  5 and 1 percent levels.  City and industry dummies  included.
43Table 4.e. IFirm-Level  Analysis:
Finance
Sales growth  Investment rate  TFP  Employment growth
Finance  index  0.051  0.022  0.143  0.047
(5.30)***  (5.65)***  (5.00)*.*  (4.31)***
share capital  leveraged




log(initial labor)  -0.072
(7.13)***
log(initial sales)  -0.039
(6.17).**
log(firm age)  -0.140  -0.071  -0.347  -0.078
(10.68)***  (14.03).*.  (9.78)*.*  (4.97)***
Constant  0.719  0.391  3.359  0.625
(9-99).*.  (15.48).*.  (14.38)**  (8.65)*.*
Observations  1185  1258  1228  1197
R-squared  0.17  0.26  0.65  0.13
Note.  8, ^,  and  *  represent statistical significance  at the 10,  5 and 1 percent levels.  City and industry dummies included.
44Table 4.f.  Firm-Level  Analysis:
Entry and Exit
Sals  rothInvestment  TFP  Employment  Sales growth  Investment  TFP  Employment
Sales  growth  Invesrate  growth  rate  growth
Excess capacity  -0.238  -0.025  -0.905  -0.132
(4.03)***  (0.98)  (5.25)**.  (1.98)**
Contracting as share of costs  0.104  0.064  0.729  0.154
(0.94)  (1.39)  (2.24)**  (1.29)
log(initial capital)  -0.025  -0.026
(7.93)***  (8.46)***
log(labor)  -0.052  -0.046
(2.05)**  (1.78)*
log(initial labor)  -0.058  -0.057
(6.02)***  (5.96)***
log(initial sales)  -0.032  -0.026
(5.35)***  (4.38)***
log(firm age)  -0.132  -0.071  -0.311  -0.078  -0.138  -0.070  -0.355  -0.081
(9.89)***  (13.79)***  (8.80)***  (4.94)***  (10.46)***  (13.62)***  (9.92)***  (5.18)***
Constant  0.727  0.342  2.947  0.367  0.719  0.351  3.145  0.527
(10.11)***  (14.05)**  (13.48)**  (5.72)***  (9.82)***  (14.25)***  (14.06)***  (7.63)***
Observations  1197  1274  1240  1214  1188  1261  1231  1200
R-squared  0.16  0.25  0.66  0.12  0.15  0.24  0.65  0.12
Note.  *  *,  and *** represent statistical significance at the  10, 5 and 1 percent levels.  City and industry dummies included.
45Table 5. Investment CliUmate and Firm Performance:
Firm-Level Analysis, All Variables Included
Sales  Sales  Investment  Investment  TFP  TFP  Employment
growth  |  growth  rate  rate  growth  growth
Share foreign ownership  0.227  0.225  -0.021  -0.023  0.910  0.901  0.206  0.203
(3.26)r  (3.23)r-  (0.76)  (0.83)  (5.1o0)°°  (5.07)r  (3.62r)*  (3.56)°-
Share domestic private ownership  -0.020  -0.025  -0.001  -0.004  0.493  0.509  -0.028  -0.035
(0.45)  (0.57)  (0.05)  (0.24)  (4.04)-  (4.18)--  (0.77)  (0.95)
-0.023  -0.022  -0.040  -0.041  0.330  0.360  0.083  0.084
(0.26)  (0.24)  (1.10)  (1.14)  (1.41)  (1.54)  (1.10)  (1.12)
Exports as share of sales  -0.046  -0.047  0.018  0.018  -0.142  -0.132  0.021  0.018
(0.78)  (0.79)  (0.77)  (0.76)  (0.93)  (0.87)  (0.42)  (0.38)
border  -0.008  -0.011  -0.140  0.157
(0.04)  (0.13)  (0.26)  (0.92)
Excess capacity  -0.262  -0.270  -0.016  -0.019  -0.744  -0.731  -0  142  -0.150
(3.29)r  (3.38)--  (0.50)  (0.58)  (3.59)°°  (3.54)r-  (2.15)--  (2.27r
Contracting as share of costs  0.058  0.056  0.033  0.035  0.836  0.742  0.080  0.091
(0.37)  (0.35)  (0.55)  (0.58)  (2.13)r  (1.88)*  (0.67)  (0.75)
Share of nonpermanent  workers  0.123  0.119  0.092  0.088  0.442  0.472  0.068  0.058
(1.71)-  (1.65)  (3.22)*-  (3.04)-  (2.40)  (2.56)*  (1.14)  (0.97)
Share of labor that receives formal training  0.090  0.089  0.053  0.052  0.004  0.014  0.027  0.024
(2.78)r  (2.72)°°  (3.97)°°  (3.93)-  (0.04)  (0.16)  (1.00)  (0.89)
Staff quality index  0.013  0.015  0.021  0.021  0.100  0.112  -0.010  -0.008
(0.70)  (0.84)  (2.89)...  (2.91)°°  (2.09)°°  (2.34)'°  (0.68)  (0.55)
Finance index  0.035  0.034  0.012  0.013  0.098  0.073  0.004  0.005
(2.58)°°  (2.48)°°  (2.18)°°  (2.41)°  (2.73)r-  (1 ggr)*  (0.39)  (0.40)
share capital leveraged  0.163  0.160  0.008  0.003  -0.004  0.044  0.138  0.134
(2.69).  (2.62)..  (0.33)  (0.12)  (0.03)  (0.27)  (2.73).  (2.64)..
R&D index  0.013  0.011  0.021  0.020  0.067  0.065  0.032  0.028
(0.90)  (0.73)  (3.68)...  (3.47)*°  (1.68)r  (1.61)  (2.57)°°  (2.25)--
-0.405  -0.388  -0 075  -0.075  0.663  0.909  0.003  -0.012
share of sales lost from theft or breakage  (1.15)  (1.09)  (0.52)  (0.52)  (0.71)  (0.97)  (0.01)  (0.04)
-0.307  -0.340  -0.116  -0.144  -1.365  -1.070  -0.276  -0.333
share sales lost from electricity outages  (1.00)  (.1-0)  (0.92)  (1.13)  (1.65r  (1.29)  (1.08)  (1.29)
ICT index  0.052  0.051  0.016  0.015  0.292  0.276  -0.015  -0.014
(2.34)°°  (2.26)-4  (1.76)°  (1.72)-  (5.09)***  (4.74)*°  (0.82)  (0.74)
46Table 5. Investment Climate and Firm Performance:
Firm-Level  Analysis, All Variables  Included (Cont'd)
Sales  Sales  Investment  Investment  TFP  TFP  Employment  Employment
growth  growth  rate  rate  growth  growth
Share of firms refusing to answer  -0.021  -0.027  0.009  0.006  -0.079  -0.051  0.036  0.024
managers' time with regulators  (0.52)  (0.67)  (0.54)  (0.37)  (0.77)  (0.48)  (1.09)  (0.70)
Time  with regulators/inspectors  0.060  0.057  0.007  0.003  0.004  0.015  0.015  0.012
(1.58)  (1.49)  (0.43)  (0.18)  (0.04)  (0.14)  (0.46)  (0.37)
log (initial sales)  -0.079  -0.080
(7.45r-  (7.50)...
log (initial capital)  -0.053  -0.052
(10.39)^^^  (10.19)...
log (inital labor)  -0.095  -0.095
(7.92)^  (7.93)^^
log (labor)  -0.118  -0.110
(2.96)"^*  (2.77)*^^
log (firm  age)  -0.087  -0.084  -0.052  -0.053  -0.145  -0.131  -0.016  -0.015
(4.12)^  (3.96)--  (6.67)*^  (6.78)^^  (3.00)...  (2.71)-  (0.88)  (0.83)
Constant  0.784  0.800  0.262  0.253  1.576  1.270  0.387  0.369
(4.63r"  (4.93)...  (4.38)--  (4.54)^^-  (3.22)'^^  (2.65)-^*  (3.02)^^^  (2.89)**
City dummies included  yes  no  yes  no  yes  no  yes  no
industry dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes
Observations  569  569  603  603  606  606  572  572
R-squared  0.29  0.29  0.38  0.39  0.80  0.80  0.25  0.26
Note.  *, **,  and *** represent statistical significance  at the 10,  5 and 1 percent levels.  City and industry dummies included.
47T'able 6. Simulated Change in Firm Performance Resulting from
A One-Standard-Deviation  Change in IC Variabiles
change  in  Change in  change In  Change in
one standard deviation of variable X  change  in X  SALEGROWTH  investment rate  TFP  employment
growth rate
Share foreign ownership  0.352  0.079  0.317  0.071
Excess capacity *  0.232  0.063  0.17  0.035
Contracting as share of costs  0.104  0.077
Share of nonpermanent workers  0.243  0.029  0.021  0.115
Share of labor that receives formal training  0.532  0.047  0.028
Staff quality Index  1.411  0.03  0.158
Finance index  1.365  0.048  0.018  0.1
R&D  index  1.297  0.026  0.084  0.036
ICT index  1.315  0.067  0.02  0.363
Note.  For excess capacity, the impact is a one-standard-deviation decrease.  The simulation is based on the specifications
in Table 5.
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